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I. Introduction
Wars in outer space have long been the subject of science
fiction books and movies, but recent advances in technology have
now transformed what was once reserved for fiction into a grave
reality. The possibility of an arms race in outer space is now
something that all countries must consider. In December 2012, the
United Nations reported that the Disarmament and International
Security Committee was hearing statements from member
countries suggesting:
[A]chieving space security and defusing the need for countries
to weaponize outer space were issues of urgent priority, as an
ever increasing number of space actors had made that
environment vulnerable, and progress to fill in the gaps in space
law was fragmented and only a prelude to what was
needed. . . .'
I Press Release, U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., Full-Spectrum Dominance of Outer
Space Can Turn Frontier into 'Military Theater,' Build Walls of Suspicion, Breach
Global Security, First Committee Told, GA/DIS/3464 (Oct. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Full-
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The successful launch by North Korea of a long-range missile
on December 12, 2012 2-reportedly to place a satellite into outer
space- further underscored this need to halt the arms race in
outer space. There is ambiguity in current international law
regarding the weaponization of outer space. Although the 1967
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies' (Outer Space Treaty) expressly prohibits
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in outer space,4 it does not
contain such explicit language regarding other weapons in outer
space. In fact, many have interpreted this to mean that non-WMD
armaments in space do not violate international law.' This view
has been supported by the tepid international response to the
recent weaponization of outer space.6 However, a closer look at
the Outer Space Treaty, in addition to customary international law,
suggests the permissibility of non-WMD armaments in outer space
is not indisputable. Even if non-WMD weapons are currently
permissible in outer space, a rule of customary international law
may be developing that would render them illegal. Regardless, the
ambiguity in current international law regarding weapons in outer
space calls for global cooperation to ensure a halt to an arms race
in outer space.
Part I of this Comment examines current international law
regarding weapons in outer space, and Part I outlines the recent
militarization of outer space in terms of new technologies and new
governments in the outer space arena. Next, Part III takes a closer
look at the Outer Space Treaty; Part IV discusses the legality of
non-WMD weapons in outer space, and Part V discusses measures
taken thus far to prevent an arms race in outer space. Finally, Part
VI sets forth this Comment's recommendations for preventing an
Spectrum Dominance].
2 UN Security Council Condemns North Korea Rocket Launch, BBC NEWS (Dec.
12, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20697922.
3 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, G.A. Res. 2222
(XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2222(XXI) (Dec. 19, 1966) [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty].
4 Id. art. IV.
5 See infra Part III.B.
6 See infra Part 11.
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arms race in outer space and the political feasibility thereof.
II. The International Law of Weapons in Outer Space
The Soviet launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, served as a
wake-up call to the international community.' In addition to
prompting countries-the United States, in particular-to power
up their own space programs, Sputnik also gave notice to the
international community that there was a dire need for a legal
framework for countries beginning to explore outer space.'
A. The Development ofInternational Law of Outer Space
Brian Wessel, an intern at the International Law Practice
Group of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's
Office of General Counsel in 2010, explains that there are three
distinct periods in the history of the law of outer space.9 These
three periods are distinguished by their use of primarily binding or
nonbinding agreements on outer space.'0
During the first period, from the 1960s to the 1970s, binding
space treaties were used to establish the law of outer space." This
period gave birth not only to the Outer Space Treaty,12 but also to
three additional treaties through the United Nations Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS):' The 1968
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 4 the 1972
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects," and the 1975 Convention on Registration of
7 See Sam Roberts, Sputnik Launches the Space Race, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, Sept.
17, 2007, at 24.
8 Id. at 25-26.
9 Brian Wessel, The Rule of Law in Outer Space: The Effects of Treaties and
Nonbinding Agreements on International Space Law, 35 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 289, 292 (2012).
1o Id. at 292-94.
11 Id at 292.
12 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3.
13 Wessel, supra note 9, at 292.
14 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, G.A. Res. 2345 (XXII) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2345(XXII) (Dec. 19, 1967).
15 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
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Objects Launched into Outer Space.16 These treaties elaborated
upon specific provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.
The second period of outer space law took place during the
1980s and 1990s, and consisted primarily of nonbinding
agreements.17  During this period, a collection of nonbinding
agreements called the United Nations Principles on Outer Space
developed areas of law relating to outer space;' 8 specifically, the
use of artificial earth satellites for international direct television
broadcasting, 9 the remote sensing of Earth from outer space,20 the
use of nuclear power sources in outer space,2 ' and the idea of the
"province of mankind" principle in Article I of the Outer Space
Treaty.22
Nonbinding agreements also characterize the third period of
outer space law in the 2000s, but Wessel distinguishes this period
as focused more on the technical areas of outer space law.23 So far
in this period, the General Assembly has reinterpreted specific
provisions of previous treaties and approved technical guidelines
on orbital debris and nuclear power sources.2 4 Additionally,
Wessel notes the weakening of these nonbinding agreements
through the use of self-judging exceptions in the technical
guidelines, where parties are allowed to deviate from the rules of
the agreement if they themselves determine that they meet the
G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2777(XXVI) (Nov. 29, 1971).
16 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, G.A. Res.
3235 (XXIX) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3235(XXIX) (Nov. 12, 1974).
17 Wessel, supra note 9, at 294.
18 Id.
19 Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for
International Direct Television Broadcasting, G.A. Res. 37/92, at 51, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/37/92 (Dec. 10, 1982).
20 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, G.A. Res.
41/65, at 115-16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986).
21 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, G.A.
Res. 47/68, at 88, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/68 (Dec. 14, 1992).
22 Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the
Needs of Developing Countries, G.A. Res. 51/122, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/122 (Feb. 4,
1997).
23 Wessel, supra note 9, at 294.
24 Id. at 294-95.
2014 1127
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
"relatively vague criteria" for the exceptions.2 5 This weakens
further the power of nonbinding agreements by allowing parties to
determine when they can deviate from the rules. The implications
of binding versus nonbinding legal instruments are further
discussed in Section D below.
B. The Outer Space Treaty
A direct result of the Soviet launch of Sputnik was the
establishment of the UNCOPUOS in 1959.26 Now, with 71
member states, the Committee serves:
[T]o review the scope of international cooperation in peaceful
uses of outer space, to devise program[s] in this field to be
undertaken under United Nations auspices, to encourage
continued research and the dissemination of information on
outer space matters, and to study legal problems arising from the
exploration of outer space. 27
Since its creation, UNCOPUOS has functioned as the vehicle
for negotiating most multilateral agreements on outer space, which
are then adopted by the General Assembly and implemented for
the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA).2 8
The most important of these agreements is undoubtedly the Outer
Space Treaty, which has served as the basic framework of outer
space law.29 The Outer Space Treaty has been referred to as the
"constitution"30 and the "magna carta"31 of outer space.
The Outer Space Treaty was designed not only to halt the
space race initiated by the launch of Sputnik, but also to protect
25 Id. at 296.
26 International Co-Operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1472
(XIV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1472(XIV) (Dec. 12, 1959).
27 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, United Nations Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, http://www.unoosa.org/ousa/en/COPUOS/
copuos.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
28 Wessel, supra note 9, at 291.
29 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3.
30 Pamela L. Meredith, The Legality of a High-Technology Missile Defense
System: The ABMand Outer Space Treaties, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 422 n.44 (1984).
31 Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of Commercial Communication Satellites: A
New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and "Peaceful Purposes," 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 237,
296 (1994).
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existing United States and Soviet technology in space." At the
time of the signing of the Outer Space Treaty, the tensions of the
Cold War were high, and both the United States and Russia
worried that the other would develop new space technology with
nuclear missiles.33 Additionally, the United States feared Soviet
interference with its intelligence satellites, which were then still
safe from Soviet air-defenses.34 Specific provisions of the Outer
Space Treaty will be discussed further in Part III of this paper.
C. Other Principles ofInternational Law
In addition to treaties, other principles of international law
likely apply to outer space. There is, however, some debate over
this issue. Some scholars argue that provisions of international
law-those related to the use of force in self-defense, in
particular-do not apply to outer space because the Outer Space
Treaty does not enumerate which principles of international law
apply to outer space.3 ' However, Article III of the Outer Space
Treaty requires parties to "carry on activities in the exploration
and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter
of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international
peace and security and promoting international cooperation and
understanding." 36 Article III makes it difficult to argue that the
text of the Outer Space Treaty does not require that general
principles of international law apply in outer space as well.
Accordingly, most scholars, including Professors Ivan A. Vlassic
and Manfred Lachs, as well as Major Christopher M. Petras, agree
that relevant principles of international law apply to outer space.37
Although Article III renders relevant principles of international
law-including customary international law and parts of the
United Nations Charter-applicable to outer space, it does not
32 Id.
33 Todd Barnet, United States National Space Policy, 2006 & 2010, 23 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 277, 279 (2011).
34 Id
35 Jackson Maogoto & Steven Freeland, Space Weaponization and the United
Nations Charter Regime on Force: A Thick Legal Fog or a Receding Mist?, 41 INT'L
LAW. 1091, 1098 (2007).
36 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. III.
37 See Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 35, at 1098.
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automatically include every provision of international law, as
certain rules of international law are impossible to apply to outer
space." Customary international law and the application of the
United Nations Charter are further explained below.
D. Customary International Law
As a result of Article III of the Outer Space Treaty, customary
international law also regulates the weaponization of outer space.
The gaps in written international law are filled with the unwritten
customary international law because there is no central global
legislation, and because the written laws of treaties "cannot serve
as a basis for a coherent legal order."" Customary international
law is recognized by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States as a source of international law.40
Customary international law is also applied by the International
Court of Justice when deciding compliance with international
law.4'
Although unwritten, customary international law is a form of
law with as much weight as treaties.42 The Restatement (Third)
for Foreign Relations Law of the United States pronounces that
''customary international law results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.' David Koplow further explains that in order to
create a binding rule of customary international law, objective and
subjective criteria must be met.44
38 Christopher M. Petras, "Space Force Alpha" Military Use of the International
Space Station and the Concept of "Peaceful Purposes," 53 A.F. L. REV. 135, 155-56
(2002).
39 Niels Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the
Role ofState Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 275, 276
(2008).
40 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102 (1987).
41 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. art.
38(1)(b).
42 David A. Koplow, ASAT-Isfaction: Customary International Law and the
Regulation ofAnti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1187, 1222 (2009).
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102(2) (1987).
44 Koplow, supra note 42, at 1223.
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There must be a "widespread, longstanding pattern of
concordant state practice," which is the "objective" criterion.45 In
determining the objective criterion, a court will weigh the actions
of states that are most active or most affected by a particular field
more than those that are not as affected, although widespread state
participation does bolster the objective element. 46 The behavior of
a state to be considered in determining whether the objective
criterion is met not only includes unilateral or joint words and
actions, but also inaction or silence.47 Additionally, the
International Court of Justice has stated that it deems "sufficient
that the conduct of states should, in general, be consistent with
such rules, and that instances of state conduct inconsistent with a
given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that
rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule." Finally,
if a particular action or consensus among states is "truly
widespread and deep," a shorter duration may suffice, rather than
the traditional requirement that it be "longstanding."4 9 This
demonstrates the "sliding scale" approach, which some scholars
argue means that the strength of one element of customary
international law can compensate for the weakness of the other."o
This is especially important in the context of outer space where
technology and corresponding policies develop at a very quick
pace.
The subjective element of customary international law requires
that there also be evidence suggesting that that pattern of state
practice is attributable to a "'sense of obligation,' rather than
merely to habit, courtesy, indifference, or political expediency."'
This element is more difficult to determine as states are not always
open about the motivations behind actions or inactions.5 2
Additionally, if a state is already acting out of a sense of legal
45 Id
46 Id. at 1224.
47 Id. at 1225.
48 Id at 1224 (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)).
49 Id. at 1224.
50 See Petersen, supra note 39, at 283 n.32 (citing Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., John
Tasioulas, and Anhea E. Roberts as scholars who advocate the sliding scale approach).
51 Koplow, supra note 42, at 1223.
52 See id at 1224.
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obligation, it likely believes that the customary international law
already exists. 5 3 However, Koplow suggests a continuum between
voluntary and compulsory, during which states think it is improper
not to follow the course of action and then, eventually, the
conformity reaches such a level that states agree it is illegal to not
follow the practice.54
Today, some scholars argue that customary international law is
shifting more toward an emphasis on strong statements regarding
the legal obligations behind certain actions and away from the
emphasis on state practices over a long period of time." This new
type of customary international law is referred to as "instant"
customary intetnational law or "instant custom."5 6 According to
this theory, a rule of customary international law "arises out of (1)
an articulation of the putative law and (2) an act in support of it or
acquiescence demonstrating acceptance of it."'5 7  This way,
customary international law can be formed much more quickly
and by action on the part of fewer countries, although it still
requires international acceptance." Some scholars, however,
argue that this more rapid pace of instant customary international
law, as opposed to actions over a longer period of time by a
broader range of states, does not constitute custom. 59 Outer space
is a prime example of an arena in which technology advances at a
rate incompatible with traditional ideas about customary
international law.60 In these cases, instant customary law may
serve an important role in ensuring that the law can keep pace with
53 See id. at 1225-26.
54 Id. at 1226.
55 Wessel, supra note 9, at 299 (citing Anthea E. Roberts, Traditional and Modern
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757,
758-60 (2001)).
56 See Wessel, supra note 9, at 299; Jacob M. Harper, Technology, Politics, and
the New Space Race: The Legality and Desirability of Bush's National Space Policy
Under the Public and Customary International Laws of Space, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 681,
690 (2007-08).
57 Harper, supra note 56, at 690-91 (citing Benjamin Langille, Note, It's "Instant
Custom ": How the Bush Doctrine Became International Law After the Terrorist Attacks
ofSeptember 11, 2001, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 151 (2003)).
58 Id. at 691.
59 Id
60 See generally Harper, supra note 56 (noting that "in areas of law where
technology and politics change rapidly, the traditional deliberative process is too slow").
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the technology.
Customary international law is generally less definite than
treaties as it is dynamic and not as easy to ascertain as the simple
reading of a treaty's text.' However, customary international law
can sometimes be more powerful than treaties in that it binds even
those countries that were not aware of the law as it developed.6 2
Unlike treaties, where a country may decide not to sign or may
simply not be involved, the only countries left out of customary
international law are those that were "persistent objectors" to the
norm as it developed, "publicly and consistently" repudiating it.63
E. Analogies: Antarctica, Airspace, and the High Seas
Jacob Harper, author of Technology, Politics, and the New
Space Race, suggests an interesting alternative to instant
customary international law when determining the law of outer
space. Harper suggests that certain systems of law for
geographical areas on Earth can be analogized to space in order to
determine the customary international law of outer space.'
Harper points out that the origins of the system of law for outer
space come from looking at systems of law for other unclaimed
territories like Antarctica, the high seas, and airspace.65
Antarctica is an example of an unclaimed territory that was
intended to be kept free of military activities and claims of
sovereignty." Unlike space, however, Antarctica has actually
been kept free of these activities.6 7 Because some military
technologies were already stationed in outer space at the time of
the Outer Space Treaty, and most military activities in outer space
have continued largely without objection, it would be difficult to
conclude that the legal regime for Antarctica can be analogized to
61 Koplow, supra note 42, at 1223.
62 Id. at 1229.
63 Id.
64 Harper, supra note 56, at 692.
65 Id. (citing Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The
Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 363, 372 (2004)).
66 Cythnia B. Zhang, Do As I Say, Not As I Do-Is Star Wars Inevitable?
Exploring the Future of International Space Regime In the Context of the 2006 U.S.
National Space Policy, 34 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 422, 423 (2008).
67 Id. at 423.
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68outer space for customary international law purposes.
On the other hand, Harper points out that the legal regime of
airspace is less focused on peaceful purposes and based more on
sovereignty, as states have exclusive domain over and the right to
attack foreign aircraft above their territory.6 ' Analogizing airspace
law to outer space would therefore give states the right to destroy a
satellite if its orbit crossed through the area above its territory.70
This analogy would essentially legalize not only the placement of,
but the use of anti-satellite weapons in outer space, which
contradicts the use of space for "peaceful purposes," regardless of
whether peaceful purposes is interpreted to mean non-military or
non-aggressive." Therefore, this analogy is inconsistent not only
with prior state practice, but the Outer Space Treaty itself.
Finally, Harper points to the fact that many legal scholars have
analogized outer space to the high seas.72 Like outer space, the
high seas are preserved as a common resource for all.73 If the law
of the high seas were analogized to outer space, Harper argues
countries would be allowed to use outer space without restriction,
as long as that use did not interfere with another country's right to
use outer space for their purposes as well. 74 Harper posits that
analogizing high seas law to outer space would be beneficial, not
only because it would ensure all countries an equal opportunity to
use outer space, but also because it would encourage countries not
to develop space technologies solely for military purposes. 75 This
analogy however, although possibly a good fit to outer space, does
not solve the issue of preventing an arms race in outer space.
F. Nonbinding vs. Binding Legal Instruments
As discussed above, since the 1980s, nonbinding agreements,
sometimes referred to as "soft law," have been the instrument of
68 See id. at 435.
69 Harper, supra note 56, at 693.
70 Id
71 See id.
72 Id (citing Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The
Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, 29 Yale J. Int'l L. 363, 372 (2004)).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Harper, supra note 56, at 694.
1134 Vol. XXXIX
WEAPONIZATION OF OUTER SPACE
choice to regulate outer space.76 Nonbinding agreements usually
have some of the features of formal treaties, but do not meet all of
the requirements to be considered one.n Among the reasons why
states may opt for nonbinding agreements is that the "bureaucratic
transaction costs" for creating hard law are often higher than those
for creating soft law.78  Additionally, states sometimes enter
nonbinding agreements because binding law has greater costs
(reputation, retaliation, or reciprocal noncompliance) if the state
violates that law.79 Finally, some states prefer nonbinding
agreements so that they are not subject to legal remedies."
This shift toward nonbinding agreements in the realm of outer
space law, however, may have some significant consequences.
Stephen Hobe, professor at the University of Cologne in Germany,
argues that this shift has had a negative impact on compliance with
the rule of law, thereby damaging the "legitimacy and
effectiveness of international space law."' On the other hand,
many scholars posit that nonbinding agreements can become
binding norms of customary international law.82 However, as long
as states understand that the agreement is nonbinding, it is unlikely
that they will follow the agreement out of a sense of legal
obligation, which weakens the subjective prong of customary
international law analysis.
G. Optional Rules for Arbitration ofDisputes Relating to
Outer Space Activities
For the first time, there is now a mechanism specifically
intended to resolve international disputes relating to outer space.
On December 6, 2011, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
76 See supra Part I.A.
77 See generally Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law,
2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 172 (2010) (noting that one definition of soft law focuses "on
whether or not something that looks like a legal obligation in some ways (e.g., it is a
written exchange of promises between states) nevertheless falls short of what is required
to formally bind states").
78 Id. at 176-77.
79 Id. at 177.
80 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 103, Reporters' Notes.
81 Wessel, supra note 9, at 290.
82 Id. at 297.
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adopted the Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to
Outer Space Activities.83 This new legal instrument was designed
to "address the 'fundamental lacunae' in the existing dispute
resolution mechanisms of international space law. The [PCA] is
an intergovernmental organization . .. which facilitates accord
between states, state entities, intergovernmental organizations, and
private parties."84 The new rules provide:
* An option for the parties to submit an agreed document
to the Tribunal summarizing and giving background to
any scientific or technical issues that will enable the
Tribunal to fully understand the matters in dispute
(Article 27);
* Enhanced measures to protect the confidentiality of
information provided by the parties in the course of
arbitration;
* Additional discretionary powers of the Tribunal to
continue arbitration notwithstanding the failure by one
arbitrator to participate in the proceedings (Article
12(4));
* The establishment by the PCA of a list of experts in
disputes relating to outer space activities or in relevant
scientific or technical matters (Articles 10(4) and
29(7))."
The PCA, however, leaves the decision of what law to apply to
the parties involved in the dispute, and does not specify what laws
it will apply if the parties authorize it to decide the applicable
83 The PCA is an intergovernmental organization established to "facilitate
arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution between states." About Us, PERMANENT
COURT OF ARBITRATION, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag id=1027 (last
visited Apr. 5, 2014). The PCA provides resolution of disputes between states, state
entities, intergovernmental organizations, and private parties. Id. One hundred fifteen
states have acceded to one or both of the PCA's founding conventions, including:
France, Germany, Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation, and the United States. Id.
84 Press Release, U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., Fourth Committee Concludes Outer
Space Debate, Spotlighting Arena's Growing Role in Economic Development, Disaster
Mitigation, Information Management, U.N. Press Release, GA/SPD/512 (Oct. 19, 2012),
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/gaspd512.doc.htm.
85 SPACESECURITY.ORG, SPACE SECURITY INDEX 2012 61-62 (Cesar Jaramillo, ed.,
2012) [hereinafter SPACESECURITY], available at swfound.org/media/93632/SSI_
FullReport 2012.pdf.
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law.86
H. Deficiencies in the Current Law of Outer Space
At the time the Outer Space Treaty was signed, nuclear
weapons were the only contemplated threat in outer space.87
Technology has greatly evolved since then, and the weapons
discussed below in Part I pose equally significant threats to global
security." The Outer Space Treaty, however, is not well-equipped
to tackle these new technologies in its current, outdated state. 89 In
addition to the fact that the Outer Space Treaty was created when
the weapons in existence today were not foreseeable, the Outer
Space treaty contains textual ambiguities that do not easily lend
themselves to one cohesive interpretation." Conflicting
interpretations of crucial terms in the Outer Space Treaty have
significantly weakened the treaty's ability to limit the
weaponization of outer space.91
II. The Recent Militarization of Outer Space
A. Technologies in Outer Space
Space systems are important during peacetimes as well as war.
During peace, they can be used as a deterrent; during war, space
technologies can be used to "enhance combat effectiveness, reduce
casualties, and minimize equipment loss."92 Satellites are
commonly used for "communications, reconnaissance, early
warning of ballistic missile launches, weather data collection, and
86 Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities,
Permanent Court of Arbitration, art. 35 ("In resolving the dispute, the arbitral tribunal
shall apply the law or rules of law designated by the parties as applicable to the
substance of the dispute. Failing such designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal
shall apply the national and/or international law and rules of law it determines to be
appropriate.").
87 Alex B. Engelhart, Common Ground in the Sky: Extending the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty to Reconcile US. and Chinese Security Interests, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y
J. 133, 143 (2008).
88 See infra Part II.
89 See Adam G. Quinn, The New Age of Space Law: The Outer Space Treaty and
the Weaponization ofSpace, 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 475, 487 (2008).
90 Id. at 489.
91 Id.
92 Barnet, supra note 33, at 286.
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arms control verification."" However, satellites now also serve an
essential role in military operations by providing services such as
"secure and high-volume unsecured communications, targeting
and navigation services, weather prediction, and battle
assessment."94 Although there are currently no known offensive
space weapons, technologies that can interfere with, disable, or
destroy satellites, although technically "bloodless," could very
well be considered weapons or means of warfare.95 Because the
U.S. military relies heavily on space systems, disabling a U.S.
satellite could cripple military operations during wartime.
Additionally, destruction of even a non-military satellite could
devastate a society that increasingly relies on satellites for daily
functions critical to the civilian and economic well-being, which
could in turn trigger a military retaliation. The United States'
ever-increasing reliance on space systems means that it has a
significant interest in developing a global legal framework for the
development, installment, and use of technologies that make those
systems vulnerable.
1. Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellites
Kinetic energy anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities recently came
into the public eye after China successfully tested an ASAT
missile by launching it into space to destroy a Chinese weather
satellite.97 Kinetic energy weapons have been the most common
type of weapon in outer space." The kinetic energy ASAT is
designed to destroy hostile satellites through the sheer use of high
speeds and kinetic energy on impact.99
93 LAURA GREGO, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, A HISTORY OF ANTI-
SATELLITE PROGRAMS 1 (2012), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/
nwgs/a-history-of-ASAT-programslo-res.pdf.
94 Id.
95 Bamet, supra note 33, at 281.
96 Id. at 286.
97 Paul S. Oh, Assessing Chinese Intentions for the Military Use of the Space
Domain, 64 JOINT FORCE Q. 91, 95 (2012).
98 Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 22
(2000).
99 See Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite [KE ASAT], FEDERATION OF AMERICAN
SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/ke asat.htm (last visited Apr.
5, 2014).
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2. Co-Orbital ASATs
Co-orbital ASAT capabilities use a missile armed with
explosives that detonate when in close proximity to a target in
order to destroy it.I"o "Space mines," although not yet developed,
could use a similar technology to destroy a target either when it
comes within range or when a triggering event occurs. o
3. Directed Energy Technologies
Directed energy capabilities are non-kinetic, and include
technologies such as "dazzlers, lasers, high-powered microwave,
and high-powered radio frequency."'0 2 These weapons destroy a
target quickly by "shooting" it with energy at or near the speed of
light, which is an important capability during time-sensitive
situations.'
4. "Soft Kill" Weapons
"Soft kill" weapons disable rather than destroy their targets. 10 4
This could involve covering crucial parts of a satellite with paint
in order to disable optics or disrupt the power supply, nudging a
satellite out of orbit, or electronic jamming to shut down a satellite
or disrupt its functioning.' This type of "attack" carries with it
the possibility of being covert, as the effects are often similar to
routine failures in satellites, and would be difficult to detect.'0o
5. Electromagnetic and Radiation Weapons
An electromagnetic weapon-such as a nuclear bomb-could
be used in outer space without the same containment problems as
would occur on earth since outer space acts as a vacuum. 107
Therefore, the most significant impact of a nuclear blast in outer
100 See Duncan Blake & Joseph S. Imburgia, "Bloodless Weapons"? The Need to
Conduct Legal Reviews of Certain Capabilities and the Implications ofDefining Them as
Weapons, 66 A.F. L. REV. 157, 176 (2010).
101 Ramey, supra note 98, at 27.
102 Blake & Imburgia, supra note 100, at 177.
103 See Ramey, supra note 98, at 26.
104 Id. at 27.
105 Id.
106 See id.
107 Id. at 19.
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space, if it were to occur near Earth's atmosphere, would be the
electromagnetic pulse.a 8 This electromagnetic pulse would last
for only one millionth of a second but could disable electronics
within a several-hundred mile radius of the blast.o' This type of
explosion could be used in outer space to cause blackouts across a
range of land on Earth, a significant advantage during wartime."o
B. Countries in Outer Space
As a result of advances in technology and developments in
military affairs, many countries are expanding their space
capabilities and policies to support military operations, with
national security being a key factor driving the use and
development of space systems."' The United States currently has
the highest number of satellites being used for military purposes at
122,112 and the Department of Defense states that the U.S. National
Space Policy "seeks to maintain and enhance the strategic national
security advantages afforded to the United States by [the use of]
outer space.""' Following the United States is Russia with 76
military satellites." 4 The remaining 85 satellites with military
capabilities belong to Australia, Chile, China, France, Germany,
India, Israel, Italy, Pakistan, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, the
United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom."'5  Although
Russia and the United States currently dwarf the rest of the world
in military spending in outer space, spending on military space
programs is increasing around the world."16
China has been rapidly increasing its status as a space power,
and recently joined ranks with the United States and Russia when
it successfully docked its manned Shenzhou-9 spacecraft with its
108 Id.
109 Ramey, supra note 98, at 19.
110 Id
III See SPACESECURITY, supra note 85, at 13.
112 See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, UCS SATELLITE DATABASE (2013),
available at http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weaponsand globalsecurity/solutions/
space weapons/technical issues/ucs-satellite-database.html.
113 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE STRATEGY 4 (2011).
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 SPACESECURITY, supra note 85, at 105.
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orbiting space lab, Tiangong-l." 7  This was part one of the
ambitious Chinese space program, which the New York Times
reports is "essentially military," stating that "[i]ts every function is
designed to carry out a military objective or one that improves the
welfare of the state.""' Additionally, on January 11, 2007, China
successfully tested an ASAT missile by destroying a Chinese
weather satellite orbiting at 500 miles altitude, which is the same
altitude at which many U.S. spy satellites orbit." 9
China, however, is not the only country increasing its military
actions in outer space. India has also become a growing power in
outer space, announcing that it must "optimize space applications
for military purposes," pointing out that "[t]he Chinese space
program is expanding at an exponentially rapid pace in both
offensive and defensive content."l20 India launched its first
satellite dedicated solely to military use in August 2013.121
In 2008, Japan authorized military use of space, passing
legislation that removed the ban on using Japanese space assets for
military purposes.122 Iran launched its first satellite in 2005 with
the support of a Russian launcher, and the head of Iran's space
program reported that the satellite is capable of spying on Israel.12 3
Possibly in response to Iran, Israel launched a reconnaissance
satellite in 2008, which is considered "one of the world's most
advanced space reconnaissance systems" and is "reportedly used
to spy on Iran." 24
Many European states share capabilities for outer space
military support, particularly communications and imagery.'
117 Is China's Space Program a Threat to America's?, WEEK (June 25, 2012),
http://theweek.com/article/index/229763/is-chinas-space-program-a-threat-to-americas.
118 Douglas MacKinnon, Space, the Missing Frontier, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2012),
http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/space-the-missing-frontier.
119 Oh, supra note 97, at 22.
120 David R. Sands, China, India Hasten Arms Race in Space, WASH. TIMES, June
25, 2008, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/25/china-india-hasten-arms-
race-in-space/#ixzz2qhciVLNu.
121 India Launches First Defence Satellite GSAT-7, BBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-23894646.
122 Koplow, supra note 42, at 1193.
123 SPACESECURITY, supra note 85, at 121.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 122.
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Germany's first military satellite system as well as Italy's radar
satellites will likely be integrated with the optical remote sensing
satellites that belong to France, which has the "most advanced and
diversified independent military space capabilities." 26
The increased participation in outer space serves to level the
playing field and balance Russia's and the United States' long-
held domination in the arena as well as increases the number of
countries with an interest in and awareness of the need to place
guidelines and restrictions on the militarization of outer space.12 7
However, the ability to limit the increasing military expansion into
outer space depends not only on intergovernmental cooperation,
but also on a shared understanding of the legal framework which
governs outer space.
C. Why the Militarization of Outer Space Matters
The militarization of outer space has the potential to
destabilize current relations between states and result in a less safe
world. More specifically, the United States has a significant
interest in halting the weaponization of outer space as it relies
heavily on outer space technology to promote national security.12 8
Satellites that currently serve important peace and wartime
functions (including reconnaissance, surveillance,
communications, early warning of missile launches, and data
collection) 2 9 could be threatened by a proliferation of ASAT
weapons in outer space.' 30 Additionally, if countries currently
capable of militarizing outer space, such as the United States and
Russia, pursue unhindered military operations in outer space, other
nations will likely follow, thereby bringing potentially
unpredictable-or even dangerous-players into the mix.'
Finally, the ease with which ASAT weapons can destroy other
more-expensive and technologically advanced space systems
126 Id.
127 See Koplow, supra note 42, at 1193; see also SPACESECURITY, supra note 85, at
122.
128 Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and its Treat to National Security: A
Proposal for a Binding International Agreement to Clean up the Junk, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 589, 593 (2012).
129 See GREGO, supra note 93, at 1.
130 See id
131 Engelhart, supra note 87, at 137.
Vol. XXXIX1142
WEAPONIZATION OF OUTER SPACE
means that countries with weapons in outer space may be
encouraged to use them in a surprise attack to avoid their
destruction by ASAT weapons.132 It also means that relatively
unsophisticated non-governmental groups-terrorist groups
included-may eventually have ASAT capabilities that could be
used to cripple a nation's military operations as well as day-to-day
societal functioning. 33
III. The Outer Space Treaty
As discussed above, the Outer Space Treaty serves as a sort of
"constitution" for activities in outer space. With 101 parties-
including the United States, the Russian Federation, China, India,
Iran, and Israel-as of January 1, 2012,134 the treaty sets forth the
basic principles to be upheld in outer space law. Those principles
are as follows:
* [T]he exploration and use of outer space shall be carried
out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries and shall be the province of all mankind;
* [T]he outer space shall be free for exploration and use
by all States;
* [T]he outer space is not subject to national appropriation
by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation,
or by any other means;
* States shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons
of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or
station them in outer space in any other manner;
* [T]he Moon and other celestial bodies shall be
used exclusively for peaceful purposes;
* [A]stronauts shall be regarded as the envoys of
mankind;
* States shall be responsible for national space activities
whether carried out by governmental agencies or non-
governmental entities;
* States shall be liable for damage caused by their space
objects; and
132 Id. at 138.
133 Id at 139.
134 Comm. On the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm., Rep. on its 51st
Sess., Mar. 19-Mar. 30, 2012, U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/C.2/2012/CRP.3 (Mar. 12, 2012).
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* States shall avoid harmful contamination of space and
celestial bodies.135
A. What the Outer Space Treaty Does and Does Not Prohibit
In accordance with the above principles, the Outer Space
Treaty prohibits and requires certain types of action in outer space.
Specifically, the treaty requires that "[t]he exploration and use of
outer space . . . shall be carried out for the benefit of all
countries ... and shall be the province of all mankind."'3 6
Accordingly, the Treaty prohibits claims of sovereignty on the
Moon and other celestial bodies,'37 requires "international
responsibility for national activities in outer space,""' and
mandates that all parties to the treaty assist astronauts of any
country in need of help as they are considered "envoys of
mankind."l3 9 With regard to military operations in outer space, the
Outer Space Treaty prohibits placing any weapons of mass
destruction in orbit around earth, on celestial bodies, or stationed
in outer space in any other manner.'40 The treaty also prohibits
"the establishment of military bases, installations and
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons, and the conduct
of military maneuvers on celestial bodies."'41
Notably, the Outer Space Treaty does not mention the presence
of non-WMD armaments in orbit around Earth or elsewhere in
outer space,14 2 nor does it prohibit establishing military bases in
outer space if they are not stationed on a celestial body.'4 3
However, one additional phrase in Article IV, discussed below,
may serve to encompass some of the military actions that the
135 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, arts. I-IX; Treaties on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and other Celestial Bodies, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
136 Id. art. I.
137 Id. art. J1.
138 Id. art. VI.
139 Id. art. V.
140 Id art. IV.
141 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV.
142 See id. (prohibiting "nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction").
143 See id. (prohibiting the establishment of military bases "on celestial bodies").
1144 Vol. XXXIX
WEAPONIZATION OF OUTER SPACE
treaty does not appear to prohibit.
B. "Peaceful Purposes"
In addition to the more specific requirements and prohibitions
against military action in outer space, the Outer Space Treaty
states that "[t]he Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by
all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful
purposes."14 4 The interpretation of the term "peaceful purposes" is
crucial to determining the legality of actions in outer space under
the Outer Space Treaty. Although there is no clear definition of
"peaceful purposes" in the Treaty itself, most scholars agree that
the two possible interpretations of "peaceful purposes" are that it
should be interpreted to mean "nonmilitary," while others
understand it to mean "nonaggressive."l 4 5
The U.S. official interpretation of the phrase "peaceful
purposes" is that it means "nonaggressive."l46 The reason for this
interpretation logically correlates with the fact that the United
States already had military intelligence satellites in space at the
time of the signing of the treaty,147 and therefore hoped to secure
the legality of those satellites while also protecting them by
prohibiting other military actions in space.148
In contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union interpreted
the phrase "peaceful purposes" to mean "nonmilitary," and has
always maintained that their activities in outer space were
"peaceful" and "scientific."l 49  The Soviet interpretation of the
meaning of "peaceful purposes" combined with their argument
that the actions they have taken in space have been "peaceful" and
"scientific," even when they have positioned military satellites in
outer space, may be more in line with the way countries have
acted in accordance with the Treaty.'s By arguing that "peaceful"
144 See id. (emphasis added).
145 Petras, supra note 38, at 139 (citing Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum:
The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century War and Its Possible Implications for the Law of
Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1051, 1087 (1998)).
146 Morgan, supra note 31, at 304.
147 Barnet, supra note 33, at 280.
148 Petras, supra note 38, at 154.
149 Morgan, supra note 31, at 304.
150 See id. at 303-05.
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means "non-aggressive" rather than "nonmilitary," the United
States may open the door to many types of technology that are not
considered "aggressive" but whose primary purpose may be hard
to define as peaceful, especially in the case of military
technologies."' The United Nations defines aggression as "the use
of armed force by a [s]tate against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another [s]tate or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations. . . ."152 If the Outer Space Treaty only prohibited
aggressive acts, the testing of weapons and establishing military
bases would likely not be prohibited."' The prohibition of these
acts in Article IVI' 4 suggests that "peaceful purposes" may reach
more broadly than nonaggression.
Additionally, Christopher Petras points to the origin of the
phrase "peaceful purposes" in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty,'5 1 which
led to the demilitarization of the Antarctic, to support the
argument that "peaceful purposes" means "non-military."'56
However, Petras-along with most modem-day scholars-points
out that there appears to be a consensus within the United Nations
that "peaceful purposes" means "nonaggressive" rather than non-
military""' and that the major actors in outer space have "tacitly
agreed" that, unless specifically prohibited, all military actions in
outer space are permissible.'
C. The United Nations Charter and the Outer Space Treaty
A final consideration when interpreting the Outer Space Treaty
is Article III, which states that all parties must "carry on activities
151 See id.
152 Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14,
1974) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression].
153 See Morgan, supra note 31, at 304 n.556.
154 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV.
155 Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 72 (entering into force on June 23,
1961).
156 Petras, supra note 38, at 168-69.
157 Id. at 171.
158 Morgan, supra note 31, at 303 (citing IVAN A. VLASIC, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF
PEACEFUL AND NONPEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE, IN PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL
USES OF SPACE, PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE 38
(Bhupendra Jasani ed., 1991)).
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in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law,
including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of
maintaining international peace and security and promoting
international co-operation and understanding."l 59 Therefore, a full
understanding of the Outer Space Treaty also requires an
examination of the United Nations Charter. This relationship will
be further discussed in Part IV.
D. Is the Outer Space Treaty Invalid?
Some authors have suggested that the Outer Space Treaty may
be invalid under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Vienna Treaty Convention) because of a fundamental change in
circumstances.160 The Vienna Treaty Convention states:
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred
with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a
treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be
invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the
treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential
basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of
obligations still to be performed under the treaty.'61
This article does not deal with the invalidation of the treaty, but
only the ability of a party to terminate or withdraw from the
treaty. 162 Articles 46-52 of the Vienna Treaty Convention, on the
other hand, deal with the invalidity of treaties.163 The only factors
that result in the invalidity of a treaty are: a state or its
representative's competence to conclude a treaty,164 eTor,16 5
159 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. 111.
160 Quinn, supra note 89, at 496 (citing Jonathan Thomas, Privatization of Space
Ventures: Proposing a Proven Regulatory Theory for Future Extraterrestrial
Appropriation, I B.Y.U. INT'L L. & MGMT. REv. 191, 213 (2005)).
161 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 62, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1195 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
162 See id.
163 See id
164 Id. art. 46-47.
165 Id. art. 48.
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fraud,16 corruption, 16 and coercion.16 8 The Outer Space Treaty is
therefore not automatically invalid, as there is no evidence that
there was incompetence, error, fraud, corruption, or coercion
during the creation of the treaty.'6 ' Additionally, Article XVI of
the Outer Space Treaty provides that parties to the treaty may
withdraw from the treaty by written notification, and the
withdrawal will take effect one year after that notification.170
Therefore, countries are able to withdraw from the Outer Space
Treaty even without arguing that there has been a fundamental
change of circumstances, but the Outer Space Treaty is unlikely to
be found invalid under the Vienna Treaty Convention.
IV. The Legality of Non-WMD Weapons in Outer Space
A. "Peaceful Purposes" in the Outer Space Treaty
Given the general consensus in the United Nations that the
"peaceful purposes" phrase in the Outer Space Treaty prohibits
only specifically prohibited military action in outer space,17 ' non-
WMD weapons may be permissible in outer space unless another
form of international law prohibits them.
B. Customary International Law
Customary international law may provide answers to questions
about weapons in outer space that the ambiguous "peaceful
purposes" phrase in the Outer Space Treaty cannot.
In order to determine whether the weapons listed in Part II.A
(kinetic energy ASATs, co-orbital ASATs, directed energy
technologies, "soft kill" weapons, and electromagnetic and
radiation weapons) are permissible under customary international
law, we must analyze the objective and subjective criteria-
namely, has there been a "widespread, longstanding pattern" of
states either approving or failing to object to the use of these
weapons in outer space, and is that use attributable to a "'sense of
166 Vienna Convention, supra note 161, art. 49.
167 Id. art. 50.
168 Id. art. 52.
169 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. XVI.
170 See id.
171 See supra Part I1l.B.
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[legal] obligation,' rather than merely to habit, courtesy,
indifference, or political expediency"? 72
1. Objective Element
In determining whether the objective element has been
satisfied, courts would consider not only a state's actions or words
pertaining to weapons in outer space, but also its inaction or
silence.173
Since 1985, the United States has conducted one kinetic
energy ASAT test and one high-energy ASAT test.174 The only
other tests have been conducted by China, who conducted four
interceptor tests and two or three directed energy ASAT tests.7 5
Therefore, there is not a "widespread" pattern in this regard as
only two countries have actually used these types of weapons in
outer space.
The inaction of some states, however, should also be taken into
consideration. The fact that no other states have used these types
of weapons in outer space may suggest that they are prohibited
under customary international law.'76 Additionally, although the
United States has tested weapons in outer space, there are
instances where it could have used them to destroy a satellite in
possible self-defense, but did not.'77 This suggests that while the
United States believes it is permissible to test weapons in outer
space, it may believe that the actual use of such weapons against
another state's satellite is illegal.'7 ' The determining factor is the
reason why other states have not used weapons in outer space (the
subjective aspect of customary international law), which is
discussed below.
The viewpoints of states regarding weapons in outer space
may also prove telling in determining whether these weapons are
172 See Koplow, supra note 42, at 1223.
173 Id. at 1225.
174 Id. at 1235.
175 Id.
176 See id.
177 Id at 1236 (pointing to when the United States learned that foreign satellite data
could be useful to opposition forces in Afghanistan, but did not use ASAT weapons to
destroy the satellites).
178 See Koplow, supra note 42, at 1236.
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permissible under customary international law. Although many
countries expressed negative opinions about China's ASAT test in
2007, only one country stated outright that the test violated
international law. 17 9 The Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe,
stated that the Chinese test had violated the Outer Space Treaty.so
Additionally, India suggested that the test violated international
norms on the peaceful purposes of outer space and called the
Chinese test "unethical."'"' Other states, however, while
condemning the Chinese ASAT test, did not suggest that it
violated international law or norms. The United States called the
test "regrettable,"' 82 "very troubling," 83 and "destabilizing."' 84
Other states, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada,
Taiwan, South Korea, and the European Union joined in with the
United States' condemnation of the Chinese ASAT test, but did
not call it illegal.'85 Russia also criticized the U.S. ASAT test and
spoke negatively about the Chinese test, but has not mentioned the
legality of either test.'86
Recently, at the October 23, 2012 meeting of the First
Committee of the Sixty-Seventh United Nations General
Assembly, numerous countries expressed their concern about
testing weapons in outer space.'8 7  The speaker for Brazil, for
example, stated that weapons in outer space "deepen global
insecurity," emphasizing that an interruption of the estimated
179 Id. at 1237.
180 Carin Zissis, China's Anti-Satellite Test, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb.
22, 2007), http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-anti-satellite-test/p 12684.
181 Koplow, supra note 42, at 1241.
182 Id. at 1237 (quoting Christina Rocca, Ambassador, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,
Statement to the Conference on Disarmament (Feb. 13, 2007), http://
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2007/statements/
1 session/Feb 1 3USA.pdf).
183 Id. at 1237 (quoting Theresa Hitchens, US.-Sino Relations in Space: From
"War of Words" to Cold War in Space?, 5 CHINA SECURITY 12, 25 (2007) (quoting U.S.
Department of State Deputy Spokesperson, Tom Casey)).
184 Id. at 1238 (quoting Wade Boese, Chinese Satellite Destruction Stirs Debate,
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (Mar. 2007), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-03/
ChinaSatellite).
185 Id. at 1239.
186 Id. at 1238.
187 Full-Spectrum Dominance, supra note 1.
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3,000 satellites in outer space would cause a "major global
collapse."' For Japan, Mari Amano called on countries to refrain
from any action that could cause space debris, such as ASAT
tests.189 Kazakhstan announced that it does not intend to pursue
the development of space weapons or to deploy them in outer
space at any point in the future.' 90  Australia, labeling the
development and testing of kinetic energy ASAT weapons as a
pressing security challenge, declared its support for an
international code of conduct for outer space activities."' These
statements, although demonstrating that many countries find
weapons in outer space dangerous or inappropriate, did not go so
far as to declare weapons in outer space illegal.
Finally, the European Union's Draft Code of Conduct for
Outer Space Activities,'12 for which many countries at the October
23, 2012 First Committee meeting expressed their support,'93
requires subscribing states to commit to the following:
[T]o refrain from any action which intends to bring about,
directly or indirectly, damage, or destruction, of outer space
objects unless such action is conducted to reduce the creation of
outer space debris and/or is justified by the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the
United Nations Charter or imperative safety considerations.' 94
Under this code of conduct, states would be prohibited from
testing weapons such as ASATs in outer space.195 It may even be
impermissible under this code to position such weapons in outer
188 Id
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions Concerning the Revised
Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, No. 14455/2010 of 11 Oct. 2010
[hereinafter Revised Draft Code].
193 Full-Spectrum Dominance, supra note I ("Japan's speaker said that his country
considered the code to be a constructive and realistic multilateral measure. Australia's
delegate also declared the need for such a code. While it would not be a 'silver bullet' to
solve all issues relating to space security, it could make an important contribution to
addressing issues, including the problem of space debris.").
194 Revised Draft Code, supra note 192, sec. 4.2.
195 See id. (showing that a majority of countries support legally binding regulations
on weapons in outer space).
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space, as that could be considered an "action which intends to
bring about . .. indirectly . .. [the] destruction . .. of outer space
objects."l 9 6 However, the exception for use of these weapons in
the case of self-defense suggests that the stationing of these
weapons in outer space as a precautionary measure would be
permissible.1 97
2. Subjective Element
The subjective element of customary international law is more
difficult to establish as it looks to the intent behind a state's
behavior to determine whether it was motivated by a sense of legal
obligation.198
Although we cannot know specifically why states other than
China and the United States have not used weapons in outer space,
at least one scholar points out the fact that many states possessed
the technological and financial resources to develop and use these
weapons, but have not. 199  The great number of countries with
space programs that have not used weapons in outer space may
suggest that they refrain from doing so because they believe it is
illegal under customary international law.2"0 Without further
evidence, however, it is difficult for this fact alone to establish that
weapons in outer space are prohibited under customary
international law.
3. The Result
The failure of many states with ASAT capabilities to actually
test these weapons in outer space, combined with the reactions to
the Chinese and U.S. ASAT tests, the statements at the First
Committee Meeting on October 23, 2012, and Section 4.2 of the
European Union's Draft Code of Conduct does not confirm that
there is a fully-developed norm of customary international law that
196 Id
197 See id.
198 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (asserting that "[tihe subjective
element of customary international law requires that there also be evidence suggesting
that that pattern of state practice is attributable to a 'sense of obligation,' rather than
merely to habit, courtesy, indifference or political expediency.").
199 Koplow, supra note 42, at 1235-36 (stating that many members of the European
Union as well as Japan could have used ASAT interceptors).
200 See id.
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weapons in outer space are impermissible. 201' However, they
surely demonstrate that there is also not a customary international
law deeming the weapons permissible.2 02 Rather, the status of
customary international law with regards to weapons in outer
space appears to be nearing the compulsory side of Koplow's
continuum, 203 but has not quite reached the final stage where states
feel the weapons are illegal.204 The statements at the United
Nations First Committee Meeting on October 23, 2012,
demonstrate that many states recognize the dangers of the
weaponization of outer space and are eager to establish a binding
law against weapons in outer space; they also suggest that
international norms are moving toward a view that weapons in
outer space are impermissible, which means a rule of customary
international law may be soon to follow. 205
C. The United Nations Charter
As stated above, Article III of the Outer Space Treaty requires
all parties to "carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in
accordance with international law, including the Charter of the
United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace
and security and promoting international cooperation and
understanding." 20 6 The major reason this provision was included
in the Outer Space Treaty was to address widespread concern that
outer space would become the next front for conflict between
nations.207
1. The Prohibition of the Use ofForce
Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter states that
"[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
201 See supra Part IV.B.
202 See supra Part IV.
203 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
204 See id.
205 See id.
206 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. III.
207 Jackson Maogoto & Steven Freeland, The Final Frontier: The Laws ofArmed
Conflict and Space Warfare, 23 CONN. J. INT'L L. 165, 179 (2007).
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independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations." 2 08  The majority
interpretation of this paragraph is that it prohibits all use of force,
except in self-defense. 2 09  This means that acts of aggression are
prohibited in outer space, as the United Nations General Assembly
has suggested that any act of aggression would also violate Article
2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter.210  Although the
United Nations Charter does not define an act of aggression,
Article 39 states that "[t]he Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression."211
Additionally, the General Assembly agreed on an official
definition of aggression in Resolution 3314, which passed in
1974.212 This definition is still broad, stating that "[a]ggression is
the use of armed force by a [s]tate against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another [s]tate, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations, as set out in this Definition. 2 13 Although Article 3
enumerates acts that qualify as aggression, Article 4 states that the
list is not exhaustive and reiterates that the Security Council has
the power to determine what other acts could constitute aggression
under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.214
Article 3, paragraph (b) of Resolution 3314 clarifies that "the
use of any weapons by a [s]tate against the territory of another
[s]tate" qualifies as an act of aggression, regardless of a
declaration of war.215  Therefore, whether or not the Security
Council determines that the use of one of the technologies listed in
208 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
209 Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 35, at 1104 (citing Robert A. Ramey, Armed
Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 60, 62
(2002)).
210 Blake & Imburgia, supra note 100, at 189 (citing Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970)).
211 U.N. Charter art. 39.
212 Definition of Aggression, supra note 152.
213 Id. art. 1.
214 U.N. Charter art. 4.
215 Definition of Aggression, supra note 152, art. 3(b).
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Part II supra could be aggression would depend on whether the
technology was considered a "weapon."
i. What Constitutes a "Weapon"?
Currently no clear definition of the term "weapon" exists as it
applies to use in outer space.2 16 However, in 1991, the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research proposed a definition
for a space weapon, which reads:
A space weapon is a device stationed in outer space (including
the Moon and other celestial bodies) or in the earth environment
designed to destroy, damage or otherwise interfere with the
normal functioning of an object or being in outer space, or a
device stationed in outer space designed to destroy, damage or
otherwise interfere with the normal functioning of an object or
being in the earth environment. Any other device with the
inherent capability to be used as defined above will be
217
considered as a space weapon.
All of the technologies described in Part II supra would likely
be considered weapons under this definition as they are all
designed to "destroy, damage or otherwise interfere with the
normal functioning of an object or being in outer space." 218 If this
is the case, the use of kinetic energy ASATs, co-orbital ASATs, or
directed energy technologies to damage or destroy another
country's satellite in outer space, as well as the use of "soft kill,"
electromagnetic, or radiation weapons to disable satellites or other
electronics, could likely be considered an act of aggression,
thereby violating Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations
Charter and, consequently, the Outer Space Treaty as well.2 19
2. The Right to Self-Defense
An exception to the Article 2, paragraph 4 prohibition on the
use of force is the right to self-defense in Article 51, which states,
216 INST. FOR NAT'L. STRATEGIC STUDIES, GLOBAL STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 2009:
AMERICA'S SECURITY ROLE IN A CHANGING WORLD 179 (Patrick M. Cronin ed., 2009).
217 Id. at 182.
218 Id. See generally supra Part II (discussing the capabilities of these
technologies).
219 See Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 35, at 1114 (discussing what actions in
outer space constitute an armed attacked within definitions set out by the international
outer space law regime).
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"[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations."220 This right to self-
defense, however, is limited by the requirements of necessity and
proportionality.22 ' Activities that constitute an "armed attack," and
therefore justify a response in self-defense, are narrower in scope
than those that constitute a "threat or use of force" in Article 2,
paragraph 4.222 Therefore, the use of the space technologies
described above would likely be permitted if the use constituted a
necessary and proportionate act of self-defense. 2 23  However, the
disruption or destruction of a satellite that serves not only military,
but also civilian, purposes may have difficulty passing the
proportionality requirement, since it could cripple important
functions of civilian society as well.224
V. Measures Taken to Prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space
A. U.S. Resistance
The United Nations General Assembly's recent focus on
preventing an arms race in outer space has garnered attention-so
much so that this focus has earned a nickname, "PAROS"
(Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space). 225  The General
Assembly has adopted a PAROS resolution every year since
1981 .226 These resolutions generally hold that there is a "global
interest in peacefully reconciling the competing uses of outer
space and in avoiding any further compromise of the generally
benign security environment." 227
220 U.N. Charter art. 51.
221 Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 207, at 180 (citing People v. McLeod, I Hill
377 (1841)).
222 See Blake & Imburgia, supra note 100, at 187 (asserting that "the effects of an
'armed attack' must be greater in scale or gravity than a 'threat or use of force' but that
space and cyberspace attacks could reach such 'scale and gravity' by render[ing] a
military force and its individual units relatively blind, deaf, mute, and lost (without
access to satellites for position, navigation, and timing) without using anything
traditionally regarded as military arms").
223 See Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 207, at 184.
224 Id.
225 Koplow, supra note 42, at 1217.
226 Blake & Imburgia, supra note 100, at 192.
227 Koplow, supra note 42, at 1217.
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The United States, however, has consistently resisted measures
taken to prevent an arms race in outer space, abstaining from or
even voting against numerous PAROS resolutions passed by the
United Nations General Assembly.228 Additionally, the United
States has resisted proposals to give the United Nations
Conference on Disarmament a mandate to open formal
negotiations on space weapons.229 When explaining its resistance
to talks about preventing an arms race in outer space, the United
States denies that there is either current or an imminent arms race
in outer space.2 30
The Bush administration's 2006 U.S. National Space Policy,
for example, stated that:
The United States will oppose the development of new legal
regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S.
access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or
restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to
conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other
activities in space for U.S. national interests.231
The Obama administration's 2010 National Space Policy,
however, specifically renounced the unilateral position taken by
the Bush administration, stating, "[t]he United States will consider
proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are
equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security
of the United States and its allies."2 32 It remains to be seen how
the United States would now vote on a United Nations PAROS
resolution though, as the resolutions have been adopted without a
228 Bamet, supra note 33, at 282 n.27 ("See G.A. Res. 60/54, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/54 (Dec. 8, 2005) (passed 180-2-0 with the U.S. and Israel voting against);
G.A. Res. 61/58, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/58 (Dec. 6, 2006) (passed 178-1-1 with the U.S.
as the sole vote against, and Israel abstaining); G.A. Res. 62/20, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/20
(Dec. 5, 2007) (passed 178-1-1 with the United States as the sole vote against, and Israel
abstaining).").
229 Koplow, supra note 42, at 1217-18 (citing JAMES CLAY MOLTZ, THE POLITICS OF
SPACE SECURITY: STRATEGIC RESTRAINT AND THE PURSUIT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS 246-
47, 282 (2008)).
230 Id. at 1218.
231 Koplow, supra note 42, at 1219 (quoting Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Exec.
Office of the President, U.S. National Space Policy (Aug. 31, 2006), at 2).
232 National Space Policy of the United States of America, (June 28, 2010), at 7,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/nationalspace policy_6-28-
10.pdf.
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vote since 2008.233
VI. Recommendations on How to Prevent an Arms Race in
Outer Space
Given the existing ambiguities and deficiencies in our current,
but outdated system of international law for outer space, new
developments in international law will be critical for preventing
any further weaponization or militarization of outer space.
A. By Amending the Outer Space Treaty
An amendment to the Outer Space Treaty would help to fill the
gaps in the written law regarding outer space and to address new
technologies and issues that have arisen since the Outer Space
Treaty was entered into force in 1967. More specifically, the
treaty could be amended to prohibit ASAT, "soft kill," and
electromagnetic and radiation weapons.2 34 However, given the
propensity of technology to develop at exponentially-increasing
rates, general language prohibiting the use of technologies that
damage, destroy, or disable another's property in outer space may
be more likely to withstand the test of time.235
B. Through a New Treaty
A new treaty may be even more effective in halting, or even
reversing, the weaponization of outer space. In addition to
prohibiting the destruction, damage, or interference with satellites
in outer space, the new treaty could create rules related to the
development and deployment of weapons capable of damage,
destruction, or interference, and also establish an international
body with the power to monitor member states' space programs
and enforce the treaty. The existence of an oversight body may
help to reduce some states' feelings that an arms race in outer
233 Index of Online General Assembly Resolutions Relating to Outer Space:
Recorded Votes on Resolutions, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosalen/SpaceLaw/gares/gavotes.html#ARES67_113
(last visited Apr. 2, 2014).
234 See Blake & Imburgia, supra note 100, at 202-03 (advocating for the regulation
of such "soft kill" weapons if they are used for military or combat purposes).
235 See INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, supra note 216, at 182
(discussing the difficulties of creating an all-encompassing and lasting definition of
space weapon).
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space is necessary to protect national security interests.23 6
Additionally, a new treaty could clarify some of the
ambiguities related to the meaning of important terms regarding
outer space. 3 7 Member parties could agree on specific definitions
for "space weapon," determine what constitutes an act of
aggression in outer space, and even clarify whether space should
be nonmilitary or nonaggressive and what those terms mean.238
C. Political Feasibility of a New Treaty or Amendment to the
Outer Space Treaty
Comments made by representatives at the United Nations First
Committee Meeting on October 23, 2012, suggest that countries
realize the importance of developing more specific laws to prevent
an arms race in outer space. 2 39 Even so, the feasibility of a new
treaty, or even an amendment to the Outer Space Treaty, will
undoubtedly be the most difficult hurdle to overcome when
attempting to develop a new, legally binding system of laws
regarding outer space. The uneven footing among countries,
which is a factor when considering conflict on land or at sea, is
amplified many times when outer space is involved because the
financial and technological resources necessary to gain power in
outer space are even higher than in conventional warfare.2 40 States
with no military technologies currently in outer space will be more
open to imposing restrictions on the use of these technologies than
countries who are already using outer space for military
purposes.24' In order to create an amendment or a new treaty to
which most states-especially those currently dominant in outer
space-will agree, all states must feel that they will benefit from
236 See Andrew T. Park, Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need
for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space, 28 Hous. J. INT'L L.
871, 908 (2006) ("Increasing transparency and monitoring the verification of compliance
measures also provides the necessary confidence among parties to a legal regime that
negotiated obligations are being fulfilled and, therefore, that real security benefits will be
realized.").
237 See Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 207, at 195.
238 See id.
239 See generally Full-Spectrum Dominance, supra note I (showing that a majority
of countries support legally binding regulations on weapons in outer space).
240 See Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 207, at 194.
241 See Barnet, supra note 33, at 288-89.
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the treaty.24
The United States will likely prove the biggest obstacle in
establishing a new treaty or amending the Outer Space Treaty.
The United States has a history of resisting many international
agreements, in part because the United States believes those
agreements come with some deterioration of U.S. sovereignty. 24 3
Additionally, the United States has a track record of resisting
agreements specifically designed to prevent an arms race in outer
space.244 However, with the era of the Bush Administration over,
the United States may be more open to an agreement on outer
space.245 Comments made by Frank A. Rose, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and
Compliance of the U.S. Department of State, during a presentation
at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum
Space Security Workshop bolster the idea that the United States is
now more open than during previous administrations to an
agreement that would curtail the weaponization of outer space.2 46
Rose stated that an International Code of Conduct, such as the
European Union's, "would help prevent mishaps, misperceptions,
and mistrust in space by establishing non-legally binding
guidelines that reduce the hazards of accidental and purposeful
debris-generating events." 2 47  This openness to the European
Union's International Code of Conduct signals that the United
States' position on weapons in outer space may be shifting toward
a willingness to agree against the use of anti-satellite weapons in
outer space, in accordance with the Code's Section 4.2.248
A new agreement on outer space should, however, be legally
242 See Quinn, supra note 89, at 497 n.195 (explaining that the international climate
at the time of the Outer Space Treaty meant that it addressed fears borne by every
nation).
243 Sarah Ashfaq, Something for Everyone: Why the United States Should Ratify the
Law of the Sea Treaty, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & PoL'Y 357, 360 (2010).
244 See supra Part V.A.
245 See Barnet, supra note 33, at 288.
246 See Frank A. Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control,
Verification and Compliance, Remarks: Strengthening Security in Space through
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (Dec. 6, 2012), available at
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/201625.htm.
247 Id
248 Revised Draft Code, supra note 192, sec. 4.2.
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binding in order to effectively prevent the weaponization of outer
space. Although the European Union's International Code of
Conduct is a good starting point, specific provisions prohibiting
military actions in outer space would be more effective than the
narrow, albeit specific, prohibition of the destruction of outer
space objects.2 49 This provision would not prevent weapons such
as the "soft kill" weapons or some uses of the electromagnetic and
radiation weapons discussed above.250
1. Should the United States Ratify a New Treaty or
Amendment?
The United States would be well served by signing onto a new
treaty limiting the weaponization of outer space. Although the
United States is currently dominant in outer space, and while most
other countries do not have the financial or technological
resources to match the United States, the relative simplicity and
affordability of some technologies-kinetic energy ASAT, in
particular-means that space superiority does not necessarily
equal invulnerability to an attack that could cripple military
operations or even the daily life of civilian society.25 ' By agreeing
to some limitations on the militarization of outer space, the United
States could still keep most of its current space technologies,
which are crucial for military and civilian operation, but would
protect these technologies from damage, destruction or
interference by other countries.2 52
D. By Enhancing Customary International Law
Enhancing customary international law may be a more
effective means of preventing an arms race in outer space. Even if
a broadly supported treaty is unfeasible, customary international
law could bind countries who did not explicitly agree to the law,
as long as the country does not "publicly and consistently"
repudiate that law or norm.2 53 In this way, a rule of customary
international law may be not only easier than negotiating a treaty,
249 See Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 207, at 184-85.
250 See supra Part II.A.4-5.
251 See Barnet, supra note 33, at 286-87.
252 See id at 291.
253 Koplow, supra note 42, at 1229.
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but also farther-reaching.2 54 States opposing the use of weapons in
outer space should refrain from using those weapons themselves,
while also making public that they are refraining because they feel
that it violates international norms relating to outer space. 2 5 5
Additionally, those states should openly criticize any states using
weapons in outer space.256 If these statements and actions are
made by a broad range of countries, the idea that weapons in outer
space are illegal will likely take hold, and these actions can
eventually develop into a law prohibiting weapons in outer space
under customary international law.257
VII. Conclusion
Weapons in outer space serve as an advantage to the few,
which violates one of the most basic principles in the Outer Space
Treaty: that outer space is the province of all mankind.
Additionally, weapons in outer space create distrust and suspicion
among states in a world that is increasingly in need of global
security and cooperation.
It is in the interest of all countries-those with technologically
advanced space programs and those with no space programs-to
come to an agreement that prevents the weaponization of outer
space. Even if it is difficult to get important parties to the
negotiating table in order to develop written, legally binding law,
the undercurrent of international opinion regarding weapons in
outer space appears to recognize their danger, and norms seem to
be shifting toward a rule in customary international law that
prohibits weapons in outer space. With the rapidly advancing
technologies of today and the dangers that may arise if these
technologies go unregulated, this norm could develop quickly into
a rule of customary international law. If this is the case, a written
treaty agreeing to halt the militarization of outer space could
follow, and outer space could remain the province of all mankind,
254 See id at 1228-29.
255 See id at 1223.
256 See id at 1225 (noting that the subjective element of customary international
law can be hard to establish because "[s]tates do not routinely announce their
motivations").
257 See id. at 1226 (describing how gradual espousal and promotion of a certain
practice by a number of states can crystalize a pattern of initially voluntary behavior into
binding customary international law).
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used to promote the interests of all mankind, rather than the
advancement of a few at the expense of others.

